

# ROMAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANATOLIA, 167–88 B.C.\*

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## I. THE PROTECTORATE, 167–133 B.C.

The defeat of Perseus at Pydna, the destruction of the Macedonian kingdom, and the contemporary humbling of the Seleucid monarch Antiochus Epiphanes at Alexandria by an insolent Roman parvenu, are reasonably taken to demonstrate the absolute supremacy of Rome over the Hellenistic kingdoms of the Orient. At the same time the state of Rhodes suffered a drastic reduction of power through the removal of its mainland territories, and the king of Pergamum was severely snubbed, because both were believed to have favoured a negotiated settlement of the Macedonian war. Henceforth, in the consensus of modern opinion, the kings of Anatolia were puppets on a Roman string. This follows the theme song of Polybius—that Rome had acquired the mastery over all the parts of the civilized world, and in common opinion men had no choice but to listen to the Romans and obey their instructions.<sup>1</sup>

Yet, when examined on this assumption, the actions of the Anatolian kings, from Pydna to the death of Attalus III, are most surprising. The kings of Bithynia and Asia, Pontus and Cappadocia, do not exactly behave as though they were under the active hegemony of a foreign power.<sup>2</sup> The rivalry of Prusias of Bithynia and the Attalids over the control of Galatia provides a touchstone. Shortly after Pydna, when Eumenes was in deep disfavour, a Roman mission was sent to investigate the Galatian raids of which he was complaining. At a conference, from which he was excluded, the Romans failed to bring the Galatians to heel, or else, as Polybius suspects, made no attempt to do so.<sup>3</sup> Yet afterwards Eumenes did not hesitate to restore order in Galatia by his own military efforts. The worst that the Senate then did was to request him to withdraw his troops after the pacification, and to order that the Galatians, who had been left in independence twenty years before, after their conquest by Manlius Vulso, should remain autonomous, provided that they kept within their borders.<sup>4</sup> This was the strongest Roman intervention in Asian affairs for many years. Prusias of Bithynia tried to exploit the situation by a series of missions to Rome that alleged aggressive intentions of Eumenes in Galatia. Hostile Roman missions to Pergamum failed to prove anything against Eumenes, though they tried their hardest, and Prusias got nothing for his pains.<sup>5</sup>

The succession of Attalus II in 159, an old favourite in certain quarters at Rome,

\* This paper, which I delivered as my Presidential Address to the Society in June 1976, contains a summary of opinions formed during extensive work on the oriental policy of Rome from 167 to 50 B.C. The notes contain the source references and a basic bibliography. The whole field of studies down to 1950 is covered by the Notes in the remarkable second volume of D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (1950), which provides a compendium of knowledge and critical discussion to that date, since when not so much attention has been paid to this subject, especially by Anglo-American scholars, except when stirred up by epigraphical discoveries, or in connection with politics at Rome.

<sup>1</sup> It is the theme of the introductions to Books 1 and 3, put specifically in 1. 1. 5; 2. 7; 3. 1. 4, and reappears in 1. 63. 9–64. 1, in 6. 2. 3, in the introduction to the discussion of the Roman polity, and at the end of the epilogue, 39. 8. 7. The qualification in 3. 4. 3, 'it seemed to be generally agreed', is not to the theme of Roman invincibility, which he asserted unequivocally in 1. 2. 7, but refers to his opinion that to evaluate the position of Rome one must not stop at Pydna but consider how she behaved to her subjects in the following generation, since 'great successes can bring great disasters if states do not use their powers wisely'. Polybius' point of view appears very clearly in his interpretation of the Achaean revolt,

which is comprised in the tail-piece of the whole work (e.g. 38. 1. 5; 9. 6–8; 10. 11–13; 11. 1; 12. 3; 16. 9; 18. 7–8). See further the comments of F. W. Walbank, *Historical Commentary on Polybius* 1 (1957), 40–2, 129–30, 301.

<sup>2</sup> Modern accounts of the foreign policy of the Anatolian kingdoms after Pydna are somewhat selective and discontinuous. Magie, op. cit. 1, covers most of the field briefly in his narrative text: 26–33, Pergamum; 193–4, Pontus; 201–3, Cappadocia; 315–18, Bithynia. P. V. M. Benecke, *CAH* VIII, 279 f. is remarkably brief. M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (1941), does not study political relationships in detail, but has strong and influential views about them. E. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique* II (1967), 319–24 is penetrating and independent, but perforce omits much. E. V. Hansen, *The Attalids of Pergamum* <sup>2</sup> (1971), gives a full account of the activities of Pergamum, but the interpretation is mostly derivative. E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (1958), 99 f., is brief.

<sup>3</sup> Pol. 30. 3. 6–8; Livy 45. 34. 10–14.

<sup>4</sup> Livy 45. 44. 21; Diod. 31. 14; Pol. 30. 2; 30. 28; For contemporary records of his victory, including *OGIS* 299, 763, and its importance, see Magie, op. cit. II, 766, n. 63.

<sup>5</sup> Pol. 30. 30. 7; 31. 1. 6; 15. 10; 32. 1–2.

brought a change of front. Prusias miscalculated seriously by making open war on Pergamum in 156, for reasons that are obscure. His invasion was successful, penetrating deep into Attalid territory. First reports of this at Rome were dismissed as Attalid fabrications. But when it became clear that Prusias was indeed the aggressor, the Senate sent repeated missions to stop the war.<sup>6</sup> Prusias proved remarkably contumacious for a man who had once performed a *proskunesis* to the whole Senate in formal session. He refused to accept the Roman conditions, and threatened their envoys with violence. Attalus meanwhile assembled strong forces, but held them back on Roman advice. Finally the Roman envoys cancelled the formal treaty between Rome and the Bithynian kingdom. Though this was not a declaration of war, Prusias lost his nerve. Peace was made in 154. Prusias had to pay reparations to Attalus, but both sides surrendered occupied territory, and Prusias retained his kingdom.<sup>7</sup> Though the ultimate authority of Rome is evident, it is astonishing that these events took place, if the Anatolian kings after Pydna considered themselves to be merely the puppets of Rome. The brevity of the evidence often makes it difficult to judge situations. But the discredited Eumenes had not hesitated to attack the Galatians without Roman approval. Prusias, though he had failed to make headway while Eumenes was alive, expected to be allowed a free hand against his favoured successor, and was not easily deterred.

A few years later, Attalus acted with similar independence against Prusias. A conspiracy was set afoot in 149 by an agent of Attalus at Rome with the crown prince of Bithynia, young Nicomedes. Nicomedes sailed to Pergamum. Attalus invaded Bithynia on his behalf, and Nicomedia opened its gates. No prior Roman approval was sought, and a belated Roman mission failed to prevent the replacement of old Prusias by young Nicomedes. Afterwards Attalus coolly claimed that Prusias had violated the previous settlement made by the Romans.<sup>8</sup> But he had done nothing except to delay the repayment of reparations, and Rome did not withdraw its support from him.

Then there is the remarkable affair of the intervention of Attalus in the Cappadocian succession. Cappadocia had come into the Roman orbit after Magnesia. Ariarathes IV, the ally of Antiochus Megas, made his submission to Manlius Vulso and became a formal ally of the Roman people. He had his son and heir educated at Rome, who on his succession as Ariarathes V was at pains to secure his formal recognition from the Roman Senate.<sup>9</sup> When his kingdom was harried by Galatian raiders, he gained the support of a Roman mission that was travelling through Cappadocia to Syria, and offered it every assistance in its Syrian assignment.<sup>10</sup> Yet when Ariarathes was ousted from his throne in 158 by his brother Orophernes, in conjunction with the Seleucid king Demetrius, who was *persona non grata* at Rome, Ariarathes sought in vain for help from the Senate in his restoration. The Senate merely recommended the division of the kingdom between the brothers. Ariarathes, returning disconsolate from Italy, was restored to his throne by the armed intervention of Attalus, and he showed his gratitude by helping Attalus in the war with Prusias.<sup>11</sup> There was a curious incident when Attalus and Ariarathes conjointly ravaged the territory of the free state of Priene, to compel the restoration of certain monies to Ariarathes. Priene appealed to Rome as the guarantor of her freedom, but the Senate took no firm action.<sup>12</sup>

The Senate seems remarkably unconcerned in this decade about events in Anatolia, though there were no great wars in Europe or Africa to distract its attention between 167 and the troubled years from *c.* 150 onwards. Its occasional interventions were frequently ineffective. The initiative that prompted such intervention came from the parties themselves seeking Roman diplomatic support. Galatia only became an issue at Rome when Prusias or

<sup>6</sup> Pol. 32. 15-16, cf. App., *Mithr.* 3; Diod. 31. 35; *OGIS* 323, 15-22, confirming Polybius. Cf. also Pol. 33. 1. 1-2; 13. 4-5.

<sup>7</sup> Pol. 33. 12-13; App., *Mithr.* 3.

<sup>8</sup> Pol. 36. 14; App., *Mithr.* 4-7; Strabo 13. 4. 2 (624). Cf. *OGIS* 327, celebrating 'Attalus and those who marched with him against Prusias and besieged Nicomedia'.

<sup>9</sup> Pol. 31. 3; Diod. 31. 19. 7; Livy 42. 19. 3-6; 29. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Pol. 31. 8, 32. 3.

<sup>11</sup> All this is relatively well-documented: Pol. 32. 10-12; Diod. 31. 32-32b; App., *Syr.* 47; Justin 35. 1. 2. Cf. Magie, *op. cit.* II, 1097, n. 9, on the discrepant version of Livy, *Ep.* 47: 'a senatu restitutus est'.

<sup>12</sup> For the war against Prusias, Pol. 33. 12-13. For Priene, 33. 6. 6-8, and the fragmentary *OGIS* 351, in which the Senate merely instructs a Roman magistrate to write to the kings. Magie, *op. cit.* I, 117, ignores Polybius' statement that the Senate 'paid no attention'.

Eumenes acted as prompters. The Roman role was limited to maintaining the *status quo* of each party at the end of an affair, even when Prusias or Orophernes was manifestly in the wrong. *Status quo* rather than balance of power is the key-note. The kings themselves behaved as though there was still room for acts of aggrandisement which Rome could be induced to countenance. Remarkable light is cast on the situation by a letter of Attalus II to the High Priest of the temple state of Pessinus, about a warlike enterprise.<sup>13</sup> Attalus explains how he consulted his advisers when planning an attack on an unnamed enemy—probably the Galatians. All agreed with the king except one, who insisted that nothing must be done without consulting Rome. This had not occurred to Attalus or the others. After many days of discussion they finally agreed to do nothing without the Romans, because ‘if I succeed it will renew the envy and suspicion which they felt for my brother Eumenes, and if I fail it will be utterly disastrous. So we decided to seek Roman approval . . . then if we fail they will help and protect us’.

This letter demonstrates the very opposite of what it is often taken to show. What is remarkable is not the dependence on Roman approval, but that this factor had been entirely forgotten by the king and all but one of his advisers, who were not easily persuaded to change their minds. Magie speaks of Attalus’ fixed policy of always seeking Roman approval.<sup>14</sup> But this was far from the only time that Attalus took his own line. The king acted as if they believed that Rome, after instilling a proper respect into them after their various misdemeanours, had no positive interest in the direct management of Anatolia ‘this side of Taurus’.

Still less was Rome concerned in this generation with the lands beyond the Halys. The kingdom of Pontus does not impinge upon the affairs of the other kings nor they on it. No missions arrive from Pontus in Rome or sail from Rome to Sinope in the historical record from 181 to 124.<sup>15</sup> At an uncertain date a formal connection was made between Rome and Pontus, and Appian notes that Mithridates Euergetes was the first king of Pontus to assist in a Roman war, when he sent ships to the siege of Carthage.<sup>16</sup> There was as yet no Pontic problem to disturb the calm of Anatolia.

What then was the purpose of the erratic Roman supervision of the Asian kingdoms? Magie, who reflects modern opinions very fairly, takes it for granted that the kings were subservient to Rome.<sup>17</sup> They lacked any real independence, and managed Anatolia in the interests of Rome. Pergamum in particular formed a strong buffer between Rome and the Seleucid empire. Magie finds no variation in the situation down to the annexation of the Pergamene kingdom. The weakness of this view is that it greatly underestimates the extent and the persistence of the freedom of action that the kings enjoyed, or believed they could enjoy. It assumes that Rome had an abiding interest in Anatolian affairs, and that the eventual establishment of direct control of all Anatolia was inevitable, because that is what eventually happened. But the second century saw a growing military commitment of

<sup>13</sup> *OGIS* 315, VI, with Dittenberger’s notes (= Welles, *Royal Correspondence*, no. 61).

<sup>14</sup> For Hansen, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 132, the letter shows that Attalus was determined to keep the friendship of Rome, and *nil ultra*. Magie, *op. cit.* I, 280: ‘Attalus, whose policy it was to be guided in such matters by Roman wishes’, with reference to the beginning of his reign; *ibid.* 27, the decision of the letter ‘was a distinct step towards closer relations with the Senate’. He adds that Attalus engaged in military activity in regions where Roman interest was not concerned, but does not probe beyond actions at Selge and Attaleia in Pamphylia.

<sup>15</sup> In 181, the intransigent Pharnaces, during his war with the Pergamene coalition, which eventually defeated him, sent an emissary to Rome, but paid no heed to a Roman commission: Livy 40. 20. 1; Pol. 23. 9. 1; 24. 1. 1–3, 5. 1. The first recorded mission after Pydna is that implied *c.* 124 by Gellius, *NA* 11, 10, which is followed belatedly by that of 103–2 (see n. 61 below).

<sup>16</sup> App., *Mithr.* 10. In *OGIS* 375 (*ILS* 30) ‘Mithridates M.f. Philopator Philadelphus’ records

his alliance with Rome. Two coins (*Recueil*<sup>2</sup> 1. nn. 2–7) and an inscription (*Inscr. Délos* 1555) combine to identify him as the brief successor of Pharnaces *c.* 159; cf. Magie, *op. cit.* II, 1090 nn. 46, 48, 49, and J. A. O. Larsen, *Cl. Phil.* 51 (1956), 157 f., against the older identification with a son of Mithridates Eupator *c.* 80 (for which see Dittenberger *ad loc.*).

<sup>17</sup> cf. Magie, *op. cit.* I, 20, on the Attalids (and n. 14 above); 202, the Ariarathids; 315–17 on Prusias II and Nicomedes II. Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 801–3, 827, regards Pergamum and Bithynia as reduced to vassalage. This all goes back to Mommsen, *History of Rome* III (1894), 234 f. The subtle Will considers this a confused period in which Rome failed to exert her power consistently, though the kingdoms were dependent on her grace and favour, *op. cit.* (n. 2) II, 302, 312 f., 320. For Hansen, *op. cit.* 141, both Eumenes II and Attalus II were vassals. For Th. Liebmann-Frankfort, see n. 18 below. Only R. B. McShane, *The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum* (1964), 190, briefly denied that the Attalids were ‘subservient’ to Rome in Asian affairs.

Roman manpower in southern Europe : the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul, the defence of the Alpine frontier, the prolonged Spanish wars, the Balkan entanglements that followed the annexation of Macedonia, and the increasing involvement in Transalpine Gaul, to which must be added the African problems, the elimination of Carthage and later entanglement in Numidia. These problems increasingly absorbed the military manpower of Rome in the second half of the century, so that there was nothing left to spare for building an oriental empire, and every inducement to leave well alone east of the Aegean.<sup>17a</sup> There was a period of relative quiescence in the fifteen years following the defeat of Perseus, but at that time the Senate was still unwilling to annex provinces even in European Greece. Beyond the Aegean, so far from seeing an increase in Roman intervention, this is the time when, as we have seen, the Anatolian kings were particularly free to practise their mutual antipathies.

A more sophisticated version of Roman policy in Anatolia as a planned protectorate is given in the many writings of Thérèse Liebmann-Frankfort, who has systematically surveyed Roman oriental policy from Apamea to the conquests of Pompeius.<sup>18</sup> For her, Rome carefully constructs a rampart of states between the lands under Roman control and the Seleucid power, so that Italy should not be exposed to a direct military confrontation with the Seleucid empire. The Treaty of Apamea effectively fixed the demarcation line at the Taurus watershed and the Halys river. So the rampart originally consisted of the kingdom of Pergamum and the state of Rhodes, both greatly enlarged by the donations of 189, together with the Galatian confederation subdued by Manlius Vulso. To these Roman diplomacy rapidly added the kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus and Cappadocia, thus vastly enlarging the rampart.

This is a buffer state theory. But a buffer state operates, as in the classical examples of Armenia in the Roman empire or Afghanistan in British India, by interposing an obstacle between two hostile powers. Either through its own strength or through the difficulty of its terrain, or both, it impedes effective military action between the two principals. That was not the situation between the Roman state and the Seleucid kingdom in the time of its strength. Rome did not directly control any territory adjacent to Anatolia down to the annexation of Macedonia, and Rome did not need buffers for her own protection after the great victories of Magnesia and Pydna. The only Roman concern was that the Seleucids should not be able to seize the rampart itself, as Antiochus Megas had done with considerable ease before his war with Rome. But if the Senate thought that the Seleucid power was a dangerous rival of Rome, they cannot have also believed that the small states of western Anatolia could oppose it by themselves.

The ancient sources that discuss the reorganization of the Asian kingdoms after Magnesia do not talk about defence but about management. There was a great deal of vacated territory and something had to be done about it. In Polybius' account the problem is discussed by Eumenes and the Rhodians, in their role as advisers of Rome, as one of control.<sup>19</sup> It is delicately assumed that Rome did not wish to take over the direct government of any Anatolian territory, and it is a question of dividing the spoils between the great allies of Rome: 'as at a rich banquet there is enough for all, and more than enough'; 'Rome has become the mistress of the world and needs no extension of material resources'.<sup>20</sup> The Rhodians concede that the kingdom of Eumenes should be fattened 'to ten times its previous extent'.<sup>21</sup> This view is repeated in the Roman tradition by Sallust's report of Mithridates' gibe that the Romans turned Eumenes into the watchman of their conquests: 'post habitum custodiae agri captivi'.<sup>22</sup> The function of the kings was primarily not to defend Anatolia but to manage it.

This helps to explain the relative indifference of the Senate to the machinations of the kings. The Senate supervised and controlled its interests beyond the Adriatic by the despatch of missions—*legationes*—composed of experienced senators. These would address

<sup>17a</sup> See n. 75a below.

<sup>18</sup> Th. Liebmann-Frankfort, *La frontière orientale dans la politique extérieure de la République romaine* (1969), puts her views together. The theme is worked out in ch. 1-2. The kings are turned into 'satellites', 'absorbed', and even 'integrated', as an alternative to annexation or permissive expansion. Cf. 101 f, Bithynia; 103 f., Pergamum; 108 f., Cappadocia.

So, e.g., when Attalus II restores Ariarathes, it must be on the advice of Rome (114-5), despite Pol. 32. 10-12.

<sup>19</sup> Pol. 21. 18-23, cf. Livy 37. 52-4.

<sup>20</sup> Pol. 21. 7-9; 22. 13; 23. 2-5.

<sup>21</sup> Pol. 21. 22. 15.

<sup>22</sup> Sall., *Hist.* iv, fr. 69. 8.

the kings as occasion demanded. One cannot help noticing in Polybius and Livy that where the great military powers are concerned, when there is trouble with Macedonia or the Seleucid king, the Senate shows great energy and takes the initiative, despatching zealous commissioners to 'observe affairs in Macedonia or Syria', and briefed with ultimatums to suit the situation.<sup>23</sup> When the young prince Demetrius escaped dramatically from Rome to Antioch, and dethroned the Roman nominee, all the alarm bells rang. The experienced and authoritative Tiberius Gracchus was sent (Polybius says) 'to look at things in Greece, to keep an eye on the other kings, and to watch developments in Syria'.<sup>24</sup>

That was a special crisis. Mostly, in the generation after Pydna, the management of affairs inside Anatolia proceeded rather differently. The senate came to hear of incidents in the kingdoms when contesting parties sought Roman intervention. The rivalries of the kings were strong, and usually sufficed to keep Rome informed. But the Senate, as we have seen, was frequently caught out by events, and able to intervene only after a *fait accompli* to restore the *status quo*. The Roman envoys did not always seem to inspire great awe, and in Anatolian contexts the Roman tail could be twisted, without dire consequences, even by such a one as Prusias.<sup>25</sup>

The scope of Roman supervision was limited by the weakness of the *legatio* as an institutional form. It was neither regular nor permanent nor ubiquitous, and it lacked any territorial base and executive substructure. In great crises a strong envoy could secure the immediate execution of senatorial policy without the support of armed force, though the more striking instances are in the context of Syria. That the Senate and its envoys so often left events in Anatolia to take their course, or intervened belatedly or ineffectively, suggests that the Senate did not take a very serious view of Roman policy in Anatolia down to the death of Attalus III.

## 2. THE INHERITANCE OF ATTALUS

The annexation of Pergamene Asia is one of the more surprising turns in Roman history, though historians generally take it for granted.<sup>26</sup> So far the annexation of permanent provinces outside Italy had been the by-product of great wars with major powers, either to prevent the recovery of a beaten enemy, as by the annexation of Sicily and southern Spain, or to secure the final elimination of the recalcitrant, as in Africa and Macedonia. No necessity, real or imagined, required the annexation of Asia in 133. Attalus II had shown his customary vigour down to his last years when he effectively defended his Thracian possessions single-handed against the assaults of the ferocious Diégulis.<sup>27</sup> Within five years his successor, Attalus III, died young and childless, aged about thirty-six. By a remarkable will he left his kingdom to Rome. No source reveals his motives. Magie, expanding a notion of Mommsen, speculated that Attalus, recognizing the pervasive domination of Rome in the East, reckoned that only direct Roman control could maintain peace in Anatolia against the ambitions of the local kings or against the sort of disorders that followed his death.<sup>28</sup> Such a view ignores the effectiveness of the previous reign, and would be more convincing if Attalus III had lived twenty years longer. Attalus, son and nephew of a sexagenarian and octogenarian, had no reason to expect an early death in the fifth year of his reign, or ultimate childlessness. His will should be interpreted by other instruments of the same kind.

The first of these was the will of king Ptolemy Euergetes of Cyrene, of which a copy

<sup>23</sup> cf. e.g. the frequent missions to Macedonia, Achaëa and the Anatolian kingdoms leading up to the war with Perseus: Livy 42. 17. 1; 19. 7-8, 26. 7-8, 37; 45. 1-5.

<sup>24</sup> Pol. 31. 15. 7-11.

<sup>25</sup> cf. nn. 6-8 above, and the notorious criticism by M. Cato of the mission that failed to save Prusias in 149, Pol. 36. 14. 4-5. If factional or family interests underly some of the ambiguities of Roman behaviour, this only emphasizes the absence of an overriding public interest.

<sup>26</sup> cf. V. Chapot, *La province romaine proconsulaire d'Asie* (1904), 5, 9, 10-11; Magie, op. cit. I, 31-2, 147; II, 780 n. 91; Rostovtzeff, op. cit. (n. 2) II, 807.

Even H. M. Last, *CAH* IX, 103, thinks that there was no hesitation, though there should have been. Hansen, op. cit. 148, 'the only logical course he could follow'. Will, op. cit. (n. 2) II, 350, as usual is more puzzled.

<sup>27</sup> Diod. 33. 14, 15; Strabo 13. 4. 2 (624). *OGIS* 330 may date this to 145, cf. Dittenberger ad loc., Hansen, op. cit. (n. 2), 139.

<sup>28</sup> Th. Mommsen, op. cit. (n. 17), III, 278. His view prevails; cf. especially Magie, op. cit. I, 32. McShane's notion, op. cit. (n. 16) 194, that Attalus wanted to end the tension between Roman and Pergamene power is hardly intelligible.

survives.<sup>29</sup> By this, Ptolemy in 155 left his kingdom to the Roman People in the event of his death without an heir. The provision stemmed from the feud between Ptolemy and his brother Philometor, king of Egypt. The basic intention was to make it profitless for Philometor to murder his brother. The last such will was that by which Rome acquired Bithynia on the death of the much harried Nicomedes IV in 74. There is a strong hint that it contained a similar clause: Sallust records the allegation that the Roman inheritance was invalid because a son of Nicomedes survived.<sup>30</sup> Nicomedes, twice expelled from his kingdom by Mithridates, had every need of such a device. Attalus could have felt the same necessity for protection against the ambitions of his rival kings or the malice of his subjects, who are represented as cordially detesting him.<sup>31</sup> It need not have been the primary intention of Attalus that his kingdom should pass into the hands of Rome. Nothing prevented him in the course of time—if childless—from adopting an heir among his kinsmen.<sup>32</sup> The Romans were far from objecting when a king of Numidia adopted a bastard as son and joint heir in these very years.<sup>33</sup> And Attalus himself had been a late and possibly illegitimate child.<sup>34</sup>

Little is known about the contents of the will, except that it granted civic freedom and territory to the city of Pergamum, as a well-known inscription has revealed.<sup>35</sup> It may have provided similarly for all the Greek cities, because the tribune Ti. Gracchus was proposing to deal in some way with all the cities of Asia, and the *Epitome* of Livy records that Asia was due to become free, when the revolt of Aristonicus supervened.<sup>36</sup> Attalus might have had in mind the condition of the cities of southern Greece after the recent establishment of the province of Macedonia. A large number were free states, exempt from proconsular jurisdiction and interference, and in some cases from Roman taxation, while even the subject cities were left very much to their own devices in internal affairs.<sup>37</sup> But whatever the intentions of Attalus, they were set aside by the consequences of the revolt of Aristonicus.

The Roman decision about Asia should have been related to the strategic situation beyond the Taurus. Though this was a time of peace inside Anatolia, new dangers had arisen in the Seleucid zone during the past decade. The Parthian power had driven the Seleucids out of their satrapies beyond the Euphrates by 141, and the effort of Demetrius II to recover them had ended in a disastrous defeat in Media in the next two years. When Antiochus Sidetes renewed the attempt in his Median campaign of 130, it too ended in disaster, and the Seleucid empire was reduced to a local kingdom in Syria.<sup>38</sup> This situation had thus arisen before the death of Attalus, and had been proved irretrievable before the final organization of the Roman province. But there is no sign that the Roman government had appreciated the implications of these events. Roman information about the orient had last been refreshed by the mission of Scipio Aemilianus to Asia, Syria and Egypt in 139. Scipio distinguished himself by a total failure to estimate the new forces at work beyond the Euphrates at that very time. Instead he was unduly impressed by the wealth of Egypt, and warned the Senate against dangers from the effete Ptolemaic monarchy. Strabo, in an account of Scipio's mission, probably derived from Posidonius, stresses the Roman neglect of the Parthian factor at this time.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *SEG* ix 7. Cf. Will, op. cit. (n. 2), II, 305 f., for a survey and bibliography.

<sup>30</sup> App., *Mithr.* 71; *B.C.* I. 111; Livy, *Ep.* 93; Eutropius 6.6. Cic., *de leg. agr.* 2. 40, 50, confirms. Sallust, *Hist.* iv. fr. 69. 9: 'Bithyniam Nicomede mortuo diripueri (sc. Romani), cum filius Nysa quam reginam appellaverat genitus haud dubie esset'. He does not allege that this was a recognized and legitimate son; cf. *ibid.* II. fr. 71, for the rejection of his claim.

<sup>31</sup> Diod. 34. 3; Justin 36. 4. 1-3. Cf. Strabo 14. I. 39 (647), with Hansen, op. cit. (n. 2), 144, n. 55.

<sup>32</sup> Magie, op. cit. II, 778 n. 87 minimizes the numbers of relatives. That Attalus remained unmarried for some years after the death of Berenice does not mean that he had no intention of remarriage.

<sup>33</sup> Sallust, *Bj* 9. 3.

<sup>34</sup> For the birth of Attalus cf. Magie, op. cit. II, 772 n. 76. Hansen, op. cit. (n. 2), 471 f., on the possible implications of Pol. 30. 2. 5, 33. 18. 2.

<sup>35</sup> *OGIS* 338.

<sup>36</sup> Plut., *Ti. Gracchus* 14. 2; Livy, *Ep.* 59: 'cum testamento Attali regis legata populo Romano libera esse deberet.' For discussion and bibliography cf. Will, op. cit. (n. 2), 351 f.; Magie, op. cit. I, 32-3, II, 780-1 nn. 92-4. It is possible that the bequest was limited to the *ager regius* and the townships other than Greek cities.

<sup>37</sup> *RE* I, 190 f. Rostovtzeff, op. cit. (n. 2) II, 749 f., and III, 1506, n. 15, for bibliography. Cf. the notable letter of the proconsul after a local revolution at Dyme, *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 685 (= Sherck, *Roman Documents*, no. 43), with Paus. 7. 16. 10.

<sup>38</sup> For a recent survey see Will, op. cit. (n. 2) II, 342 f.

<sup>39</sup> Diod. 33. 28 a 2-3; Strabo 14. 5. 2 (669). For the mission cf. A. E. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (1967), 127, 177. Liebmann-Frankfort, op. cit. (n. 18), 133, oddly thinks the disappearance of menaces to north-west Anatolia now made it possible to create a province.

The Roman Senate was in no hurry to take up its inheritance in Asia. Attalus had died (it seems) in September 134, and the tribune Ti. Gracchus had proposed the allocation of the treasures of Attalus before his own death in July or August 133.<sup>40</sup> But the Senate did no more in 133 and 132 than to despatch a commission of five senators to prepare for the organization of Asia. No magistrate with *imperium* was sent to take the province under direct government in these two years, despite the fact that a rebellion spread through Asia with increasing intensity after the publication of the will. Instead, the Senate applied the method by which order had been kept in Anatolia since the settlement of Apamea. The local kings of Bithynia, Pontus and Cappadocia were invited to crush the rebellion, and the free states also lent a hand, with some success, since the flotilla of Ephesus was able to destroy the ships of Aristonicus.<sup>41</sup> But by the end of 132 the despatch of a consul and a Roman army was seen to be necessary. The timetable is instructive. Time was further wasted by a quarrel between the consuls of 131 over the assignment of Asia, and it was not till some three years after the death of Attalus that a Roman consul arrived in Asia.<sup>42</sup> It is clear that the Senate was quite unprepared in 133 for the establishment of direct rule across the Aegean, although the ending of the Spanish war had freed their hands for intervention elsewhere.

It is true that an inscription which records the instructions given by a senatorial decree, in the last quarter of an uncertain year, to the 'magistrates being despatched to Asia' has been attributed to the year 133, because it ratifies arrangements made by Attalus at Pergamum up to the eve of his death.<sup>43</sup> But the concluding lines of the text show that this was a later confirmation of an earlier decree to this effect: present and future governors are instructed to alter nothing in respect of those arrangements; hence the otherwise mystifying use of the plural 'magistrates'. So this text belongs to the period after the campaigns of Perperna and Aquilius, when permanent arrangements are being made for the province, and ambiguities are being cleared up.

The territorial arrangements made after the revolt of Aristonicus reveal the senatorial attitude towards Anatolia. The area of the kingdom was drastically reduced to form the new province, by the grant of the regions of Great Phrygia and Lycaonia to the kings of Pontus and Cappadocia respectively.<sup>44</sup> These grants underline the absence of any strategic interest in the annexation. Through Lycaonia, an immense region of infertile steppes and salt desert, there passed the highway that led from the Aegean coast of Asia through the Cilician Gates to Syria and the Euphrates.<sup>45</sup> Its cession to Cappadocia indicates that Rome had no Syrian preoccupations at this time.

The fertile uplands of Phrygia form the hinterland of maritime and Lydian Asia. They

<sup>40</sup> The date of the death of Attalus III is commonly attributed to spring or summer 133 with unjustified confidence (e.g. Magie, *op. cit.* II, 781, n. 94). The back-dating of the Roman era on republican *cistophori* to September 134 seems to suggest an earlier date (*CIL* I<sup>2</sup>. 2, p. 761-2; Kubitschek, *RE* I 637). The sole other criterion is the length of reign given by Strabo 13. 4. 2 (624) for Attalus II, twenty-one years, and Attalus III, five years, to be dated from c. March 159, when inscriptions indicate that Eumenes II was still alive (Hansen, *op. cit.* 127). It is not clear that Strabo's years are completed regnal years. If there is an overlap, the fifth year of Attalus III, counted from 139-8, must end in 134. J. Carcopino was perhaps right about the sunstroke and the summer but wrong about the year, *Autour des Gracques*<sup>2</sup> (1967), 34 f.

<sup>41</sup> Strabo 14. 1. 38 (646) distinguishes the stages of Roman intervention carefully, *pace* Magie, *op. cit.* II, 1037 n. 10. The mission of five arrives after the kings and cities have taken action against Aristonicus and before the despatch of the consul of 131. So too Liebmann-Frankfort (*op. cit.*, 140) observes the tactical delay. Eutropius 4. 20, Orosius 5. 10. 1-2 are less exact.

<sup>42</sup> Strabo *loc. cit.*, Livy, *Ep.* 59. Cic., *Phil.* II. 18, for the quarrel. This led to a *iudicium populi* and to

the reallocation of the consular province by a *lex* that instituted a direct and open election (surprisingly), at which P. Crassus was preferred to Scipio Aemilianus, although Crassus, famous for civil virtues, lacked any military ability and as *pontifex maximus* should have not have left Italy (Gellius, *NA* I. 13. 10; Livy, *Ep.* 59).

<sup>43</sup> *OGIS* 435. Though it would suit my view to take the magistrates for commissioners, the term *στρατηγοί* can only mean *praetores* in a public document of this date, *pace* J. Vogt, *Atti del terzo congresso int. epigr. gr. Lat.* (1959), 45 f., whose argument that the phrase εἰς Ἀσίαν πορευόμενοι must refer to *legati* is contradicted by the Cnidian and Delphian texts of the Piracy Law, *JRS* 64 (1974), 204, col. IV 9-10; *FIRA*<sup>2</sup> I, 9. B. 28-9. The date may be any year after 133 when both consuls were out of Rome in September and October, since a praetor, otherwise unknown, presides. Cf. Magie, *op. cit.* II, 1033, n. 1; Broughton *MRR* I, 496; T. Drew-Bear, *Historia* 21 (1972), 75.

<sup>44</sup> Justin 37. 1. 2; 38. 5. 3; App., *Mithr.*, 57. The text of Justin 37. 1. 2, which has Syria for Phrygia, also adds Cilicia to Lycaonia, which makes no sense, unless one boldly amends it to Pisidia. Cf. Magie, *op. cit.* II, 1044 n. 28; A. H. M. Jones, *CERP*<sup>2</sup>, 131.

<sup>45</sup> Magie, *op. cit.* I, 125 f., 276-7.

were of strategic interest in the second century, before the rise of an aggressive power in Pontus, only for the control of the brigand chiefs of Galatia, whose power was broken long before 133. By making Phrygia over to Mithridates Euergetes, the Senate showed itself indifferent to the growth of Pontus, which must have already secured some form of control over Galatia, since this lies astride the routes from Pontus to Phrygia. The Senate did, however, retain within the province the southernmost sector of Phrygia containing the road centre of Apamea, from which the central highway takes its departure towards Lycaonia, since one of the military roads that Aquilius built in Asia in 129 reached Tacina, between Laodicea and Apamea.<sup>46</sup> But the roads of Aquilius, which included the remarkable luxury of a coastal road linking the Aegean ports, seem to have been designed, so far as they are known, not for external operations, but to secure control of the regions in which the revolt of Aristonicus had centred.<sup>47</sup>

The original province was limited in its extent northward by the survival of the free states of Cyzicus, Lampsacus and Ilium, which technically separated the province from the Hellespont and the Propontis.<sup>48</sup> In the south it is doubtful whether at this date the province extended south of the Maeander. The cities of Caria and Lycia, when delivered from Rhodian control in 167, were not added to the kingdom of Pergamum, and appear to have retained their free status down to the first Mithridatic war. The evidence is somewhat ambiguous, but the Senate seems not to have exploited the excuse provided by the revolt of Aristonicus to extend the province in the south beyond the territory of the former kingdom.<sup>49</sup>

So Rome was not greedy of territory at this time. Certainly the financial classes were not involved in the original decision to accept the inheritance of Attalus, because it was not until 123 that, as is well known, the lucrative farming of the tax-collection of Asia was transferred from a local function to the control of the Roman publicans. Strategically Asia was treated as a dead end for the next thirty years. The governors of Asia down to 102 had no known military functions, and it is uncertain whether they had any legionary forces at all under their command. While the European provinces of Rome were the scene of perpetual frontier warfare and aggrandisement, the praetors of Asia lived in unbroken peace. It is significant that no consular army was sent to Asia from 129 to 87.<sup>50</sup> When the praetors of Asia were first involved with Mithridates, they are found operating with armies formed from Asiatic levies, and according to the laconic sources have 'few Roman soldiers'.<sup>51</sup> The analogy is with the praetors of Africa, who likewise from 146 to the Jugurthan war fought no campaigns, and whose territory likewise was similarly safeguarded by the loyalty of adjacent kings.

The sole break in this peaceful regime down to the nineties neatly tests the rule. This is the campaign of the praetor Antonius in 102 against the Cilician pirates. We know very little of what Antonius did, but a great deal about why he did it.<sup>52</sup> Strabo explains how the pirates of the eastern Mediterranean ranged unchecked after the breaking of the Seleucid power by the Parthians, and the text known as the Piracy Law of 101-100, now extended by

<sup>46</sup> cf. Magie, op. cit. II, 1042 n. 26, 1048 n. 39; *CIL* I<sup>2</sup>. 2, 646. There is no other direct evidence at this date. By 113 Pisidian Prostanta was within the province, cf. *Inscr. Délos* 1603; Magie, op. cit. II, 1161, n. 12.

<sup>47</sup> Magie, op. cit. I, 157-8; II, 1048, nn. 39-40. For the milestones, *CIL* I<sup>2</sup>. 2, 646-51. A new stone from the Burdur region adds nothing substantial; cf. *Annual Report of the British Institute of Ankara* 1975, 10.

<sup>48</sup> Cyzicus, a city state with extensive territory, was free c. 133 (*IGRR* IV, 134, ll. 18 f.), and reappears as free after the first Mithridatic war (Plut., *Luc.* 9. 1; App., *Mithr.* 73; Diod. 38/9. 8. 3; Strabo 12. 8. 11 (575-6); Magie, op. cit. II, 1111 n. 4). Lampsacus, free earlier and never part of the Pergamene kingdom, became provincial after that war: Livy 43. 6. 8-10; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 591; Cic., *Verr.* 2. 1. 81; Magie, op. cit. II, 947 n. 51. For Ilium cf. Magie, *ibid.* 950, n. 60; whether its freedom is earlier than Sulla's settlement is not certain. See Strabo 13. 1. 27 (594-5); *IGR* IV, 194, cf. Jones *CERP*<sup>2</sup>, 60-3, 86-7.

<sup>49</sup> See A. N. Sherwin-White, 'Rome, Pamphylia and Cilicia 133-70 B.C.', *JRS* 66 (1976), 3 n. 6.

<sup>50</sup> If Q. Mucius went to Asia after his consulship, as E. Badian argues, *Athenaeum* N.S. 34 (1956), 104, it was not a regular assignment *lege Sempromia*, because he was at Rome after the campaigning season of 95, when he vetoed his colleagues' *triumphus* (Asc. 14C; Cic., *de Invent.* 2. 111). See now B. A. Marshall, *Athenaeum* N.S. 54 (1976), 117, against Badian.

<sup>51</sup> App., *Mithr.* 11, 17, 19; Cassius and Aquilius in 90-89 raise a great army of 'Phrygians and Galatians' from 'Bithynia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia and Galatia'. Cassius also had a small army, but no legions are mentioned. Cf. Memnon, *FGrH* 434, (22), 7, 'with few Romans'; Justin 38. 3. 8, 'Asiano exercitu instructos'. So too L. Sulla assisted the restoration of Ariobarzanes 'with few troops of his own but eager allies', Plut., *Sulla* 5. 7. For the possibility that he was the regular propraetor of Asia see my discussion, op. cit. (n. 49), 8-9.

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, 4-5, with bibliography.



the new fragments from Cnidos, published in *JRS* 1974, reveals the concern of the governing classes at Rome over this new problem. The law treats it as a matter for joint action. The kings and rulers of the maritime states—Rhodes, Cyprus, Cyrene, Syria, Egypt—are all urged to co-operate in the suppression of piracy. In the new text from Cnidos the proconsul of Asia is instructed to explain that this was the reason why the People have now made Cilicia a provincial zone.<sup>53</sup> The author of the bill goes out of his way to assure the oriental powers that there is no aggressive intention behind the suppression of a menace that threatened all alike. The Romans did not at this time—in my opinion—establish a new province inappropriately called Cilicia in the regions of Pamphylia and Pisidia, as is sometimes suggested.<sup>54</sup> The wording of the law should mean exactly what it says. The praetors of Asia are instructed to operate against Cilicia, the mountainous coastal region where the pirates had their strongholds. There was no need for a second province in Roman Asia. The existing praetorship of Asia was a virtual sinecure at this time, with no military and few civil duties. The praetor could very well take on the task of suppressing pirates, for which the province of Asia could supply the means—a local fleet, material resources and a naval base in Pamphylia, which was an outlying sector of the inheritance of Attalus.<sup>55</sup> Hence the operations of Antonius in no way changed or were meant to change the balance of power in Anatolia. So too with the revision of the territorial donations of 129. The Senate removed Phrygia and Lycaonia from the successors of Mithridates Euergetes and Ariarathes V.<sup>56</sup> No reasons are revealed. Some snub to the independence of the kings may have been intended, as in the removal of Caria and Lycia from Rhodian control in 167. Or, more probably at this time, it resulted from the notorious intrigues of the Roman *publicani* to extend the limits of their operations.<sup>57</sup> This was not an act of imperial aggression. Rome reassumed what had already fallen to her by the inheritance of Attalus.

### 3. THE AMBITIONS OF MITHRIDATES

If Roman policy had not altered, other events were radically transforming the situation. From about 115 onwards the young king Mithridates Eupator set about expanding the small kingdom of Pontus into an empire of the lands beyond the Halys.<sup>58</sup> His first operations were in areas beyond the Roman horizon. He secured control of the fertile lands around the eastern Euxine, in the Crimea and the coastlands of the southern Ukraine, where he broke the power of the Scythian paramount chief called Scilurus, and gained the hegemony of the old Greek cities. East of the Straits of Kertch he gained the fertile valleys of Phasis and Colchis, and consolidated his gains by annexing the intermediate mountain land of Little Armenia, which separated Colchis from eastern Pontus. These events are approximately dated to Mithridates' early years in the brief passages of Strabo and Justin that record them.<sup>59</sup> Only once is it indicated that Rome paid any attention, when Memnon records that the sons of Scilurus managed to send a mission to the Senate, which duly requested Mithridates to return their principalities to them—without any effect at all.<sup>60</sup>

Mithridates finally turned his attention to Roman Anatolia, west of the Halys, in an

<sup>53</sup> Strabo 14. 5. 2 (668–9). For the new text of the Piracy Law, cited as 'Lex Cnidia', see M. Hassall, M. Crawford, J. Reynolds, *JRS* 64 (1974), 195 f., and for the text from Delphi, *ibid.* and *FIRA*<sup>2</sup> 1, 121, no. 9. Whether this is one law or two laws of the same date is here immaterial. For Cilicia, Lex Cnidia III. 30–40, completing Lex Delphica B. 7–8.

<sup>54</sup> See my detailed discussion *op. cit.* (n. 49), 6–8, and 4, n. 11. Add that the Livian tradition of Eutropius 6. 1. 1 and 3. 1 succeeds in distinguishing between Cilicia and Pamphylia in the context of pirate wars.

<sup>55</sup> cf. Sherwin-White, *op. cit.* (n. 49), 2–3.

<sup>56</sup> For Phrygia, App., *Mithr.* 57; Justin 38. 5. 3, with *OGIS* 436, which may date its removal to 119 or 116 according to the restoration of the name or names of the presiding magistrate(s). Cf. T. Drew-Bear, *op. cit.* (n. 43), 79 f. For Lycaonia see Lex Cnidia III, 22 f., where its resumption precedes the law of 101–100.

<sup>57</sup> cf. the dispute, in 129 or 101, in the *s.c. de agro Pergameno*, Greenidge and Clay, *op. cit.* 278; R. K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East*, no. 12; cf. H. B. Mattingly, *AJP* 93 (1972), 412 f.; at Priene c. 98–1, *Inscr. Priene*, no. 111, l. 112 f.; at Oropus in 73, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 747, 24–30, and Ilium, *ILS* 8870. Cf. the new evidence for *publicani* and annexation in Thrace, Lex Cnidia IV, 15–18; also, later, Memnon, *FGrH* 434, (27), 5–6.

<sup>58</sup> Th. Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator* (1890), 49–106, is still the basic reconstruction, enlarged only for the Crimea by M. Rostovtzeff, *CAH* IX 225 f., and summarized by Magie, *op. cit.* I, 195 f.

<sup>59</sup> Strabo 7. 3. 18 (307), 4. 7 (312); 12. 3. 1 (541), 28 (555); cf. also 2. 1. 16 (73); Justin 37. 3. 2 and *Prol.* 37. For the record of Diophantus, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 709.

<sup>60</sup> Memnon, *FGrH* 434, (22), 3–4, cf. Reinach, *op. cit.* (n. 58), 95–6.

operation characteristic of the diplomatic methods of the past two generations. Some time before 101, in concert with Nicomedes of Bithynia, he partitioned the principality of Paphlagonia, the fertile zone of valleys and uplands formed by the coastal mountains between the eastern boundary of Bithynia and the Halys. The Senate, on receipt of protests from the Paphlagonians, sent a mission which the two kings succeeded in bamboozling by technicalities and bribes.<sup>61</sup> They remained in effective possession for the next six or seven years.<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile both kings coveted the territory of Cappadocia in the south-eastern quadrant of Anatolia. Since the death of the great Ariarathes V about 130, a succession of minorities and regencies had weakened the ruling dynasty. Mithridates had secured indirect control of Cappadocia before the Paphlagonian affair, through the marriage to Ariarathes VI of his sister, who was now regent for her young son. But Nicomedes invaded the kingdom and married the lady. Mithridates retaliated in the interest of the boy prince, Ariarathes VII, who eventually proved too independent for his liking. Hence another invasion, and the notorious assassination of Ariarathes by Mithridates in person.<sup>63</sup> This was followed by the installation of a pretender, a young son of Mithridates, whom we call Ariarathes IX.

These remarkable events passed without any attention from Rome until, several years later (as will emerge), Nicomedes, outwitted and outgunned, appealed to the Roman Senate in the name of yet another fictitious claimant. He was soon followed by a countermission from Mithridates, claiming that his man, Ariarathes IX, was a true Ariarathid.<sup>64</sup> The Senate at last took cognisance. But when? The dates are vital for appreciation of the Roman attitude. But they are difficult to fix. Justin's *Oriental History* is most imprecise, and the known regnal years of the Cappadocian coinage, though definite, do not have a certain starting point.<sup>65</sup> Two data seem to be agreed amongst scholars—that Ariarathes VII was still alive, unliquidated, in the year 101–100,<sup>66</sup> and that his successor, the false Ariarathes, reigned for five years before his reign was interrupted.<sup>67</sup> Hence the appeal of Nicomedes to Rome was not before 97–6. So we cannot explain the Senate's neglect of the upset of the balance of power in Anatolia by attributing it to the great crisis of the Cimbric Wars of 103–1. That may explain the Roman remissness over Paphlagonia. But Rome was seldom less occupied with warfare than in the early nineties.

The Senate finally acted with some decision, yet once more it sought a compromise solution. Both claimants to the Cappadocian diadem were disallowed, and the Senate made the remarkable proposal that Cappadocia should be given freedom: that is, that the aristocracy or feudal lords should rule the country without a king. At the same time, Nicomedes was required to vacate his part of Paphlagonia, from which he had never withdrawn, and Paphlagonia also was declared free. Justin states that this was done to placate Mithridates on the larger issue of Cappadocia.<sup>68</sup> The declaration of freedom was an inappropriate application of the device that Rome had used effectively in the past century when anxious to secure the independence of the Hellenistic city states of Achaëa and Asia. But Paphlagonia did not consist of efficient leagues of self-governing cities. The Senate could not have done more to demonstrate that it preferred weak diplomacy to armed intervention in Anatolian affairs, despite the possession of a broad territorial base in the Asian province. But this was the last evasive decision in the old style.

<sup>61</sup> Justin 37. 4. 4–9. The traditional date *c.* 104 depends on connecting Paphlagonia with the embassy of Mithridates to Rome known from Diod. 36. 35, one or two years before the second tribunate of Saturninus. Cf. Reinach, *op. cit.* 95 f.; G. Daux, *BCH* 57 (1933), 81.

<sup>62</sup> Nicomedes still held Paphlagonia at the time of the replacement of Ariarathes IX by Ariobarzanes in *c.* 96 (n. 67 below), Justin 38. 4. 6–7. I omit consideration of Mithridates' occupation of Galatia at this time, according to Justin *loc. cit.*, for lack of supporting evidence. Possibly this refers to the territory of the Trocmi beyond Halys, in which Mithridates eventually built Mithridation (Strabo 12. 5. 2 (567)).

<sup>63</sup> Justin 38. 1, with Memnon, *FGrH* 434, (22), 1, elucidated by Reinach, *op. cit.* 97 f. Cf. Magie, *op. cit.* 1, 203, and his notes.

<sup>64</sup> Justin 38. 2. 3–7. I omit the vain attempt of the murdered king's brother (Ariarathes VIII) to expel the false Ariarathes, *ibid.* 1–2.

<sup>65</sup> The Cappadocian coinage has been resurveyed and recatalogued by B. Simonetta, *Num. Chron.* 1961, 9 f., with some modification of the data on which Reinach established his chronology, *cf.* n. 67 below.

<sup>66</sup> The date results from *OGIS* 353 and *Inscr. Délos* 1576, 1902, *cf.* G. Daux, *op. cit.* 81 f.

<sup>67</sup> Coins record his regnal years 2–5 (but not 6), 12, 13 and 15, Simonetta, *op. cit.* 18. All scholars seem to take the break after 'five' to mean that Ariarathes IX was expelled in or after his fifth year and restored not later than his twelfth year (*c.* 90–89). This is not affected by the radical arguments of O. Mørkholm about other aspects of the coinage, *Num. Chron.* 1962, 407 f.; 1964, 21 f.; 1969, 26 f.

<sup>68</sup> Justin 38. 2. 6–7, with Strabo 12. 2. 11 (540).

The Cappadocian barons did not approve of the Senate's solution, and with its consent installed one of themselves, a certain Ariobarzanes, as king. We now touch on a minor controversy that does not greatly affect the interpretation of events. Ariobarzanes was either reinstated, after a brief reign and a sudden expulsion, or originally installed, as Professor Badian would have us believe, by the armed assistance of the Roman propraetor Lucius Sulla.<sup>69</sup> Sulla, in 96 or 92, invaded Cappadocia, which was held at the time by the baron Gordius, who had long acted as the agent of Mithridates in Cappadocia. Gordius was supported by Armenian soldiery, not by Pontic troops, and Sulla's army consisted mostly of Asiatic levies.<sup>70</sup> This was not an act of war between Rome and Mithridates, who had prudently withdrawn his puppet from Cappadocia before the arrival of Sulla,<sup>71</sup> but the suppression of a rebel Cappadocian in the name of the legitimate king, Ariobarzanes. But it was the first time since 188 that a Roman army of any sort had intervened in the dynastic quarrels of the Anatolian kings. Plutarch comments that the underlying purpose of Sulla's mission was to check the expansion of Mithridates, who was seeking to double the power that he already possessed. Such language had not been used in an Asiatic context since the humbling of Antiochus Epiphanes at Alexandria seventy years earlier.

Mithridates was foiled for the time but not deterred from his western ambitions. On the death of Nicomedes of Bithynia about 93, he set on foot an intrigue to replace the new king, Nicomedes IV, by his bastard brother, a man known surprisingly by the name of Socrates the Good. There was yet another arbitration by the Senate, which rejected the claims of Socrates.<sup>72</sup> Still undeterred, Mithridates removed Nicomedes by the more direct method of supplying Socrates with a private army for the task, while his own generals expelled Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia.<sup>73</sup> These events of 91 or 90 bring us to the great enigma of the First Mithridatic war. Action follows action. A Roman emissary, Manius Aquilius, arrives to support the praetor of Asia in the restoration of the two kings. They raise a large army of Asiatic levies but have no substantial Roman forces. Mithridates does not resist the restoration, but when Nicomedes, driven on by Aquilius, raids his territory, Mithridates lodges strong protests and again expels Ariobarzanes. The Roman leaders now organize a general invasion of Pontus from three directions. This act of open war led to the rapid destruction of the three armies and the expulsion of the Romans from Asia.<sup>74</sup> We are faced by a double puzzle. On the Roman side, how did their leaders in Asia allow themselves to be drawn into a war with Mithridates for which their preparations were quite inadequate, at a time when Rome was in the throes of the Social War in Italy? And, what emboldened Mithridates to believe that he could secure decisive military victory where the Seleucids and the Macedonians had failed?

For Mithridates there is both a political and a military explanation. We take it too readily for granted that the Romans were invincible. Their superiority was not so great in the nineties as it appears with afterknowledge of the campaigns of Sulla and Lucullus. The reputation of the Roman legions had been tarnished since the great victories over Hannibal and the Hellenistic kings. Protracted wars against tribal barbarians in Spain, Gaul and Macedonia had been marked by spectacular defeats and the annihilation of several Roman armies. Only the elderly Gaius Marius had shown notable military talent in the last forty years. In Asia itself men remembered how it had taken three successive consuls to suppress the peasant revolt of Aristonicus; quite recently the insignificant Jugurtha had baffled the

<sup>69</sup> The arrangement of E. Badian (*Athenaeum* N.S. 37 (1959), 279 f., reprinted in his *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (1964), 56 f.) implies that the Senate took a strong line with Mithridates in Cappadocia from the start, using force instead of diplomacy. I have criticized it in a forthcoming article to appear in *CQ* 1977. For the older view, cf. Magie, *op. cit.* 1, 206, following Reinach, *op. cit.* (n. 58), 105.

<sup>70</sup> Plut., *Sulla* 5. 6-7 is the principal source, with Livy, *Ep.* 70; App., *Mithr.* 57.

<sup>71</sup> Justin 38. 5. 6, confirmed by App., *Mithr.* 57, not noticed by Badian, *op. cit.* (n. 69).

<sup>72</sup> Granius Licinianus 35. 30 (F), badly summarized by App., *Mithr.* 10; Memnon, *FGrH* 434, (22), 3. Cf. Magie, *op. cit.* 1, 207, II, 1099 n. 19. Reinach, *op. cit.* (n. 58), 114, did not know the Flemish text of Licinianus, which still leaves much obscure.

<sup>73</sup> App., *Mithr.* 10; Justin 38. 3. 4.

<sup>74</sup> This summarizes the story of App., *Mithr.* 11-19. The Livian epitomators (*Ep.* 76; Florus 1. 40. 3-6; Eutropius 5. 5; Orosius 6. 2. 1-2) are very thin, with a different emphasis, omitting the role of Aquilius almost entirely, which reappears briefly in Justin 38. 3. 4 and 8, Memnon, *FGrH* 434, (22), 7. Cf. n. 86 below.

Romans for seven years in Numidia.<sup>75</sup> By the nineties Roman manpower was gravely stretched. On four European frontiers, in Spain, Transalpine Gaul, north Italy and Macedonia, tribal pressures, both external and internal, required the constant presence of legionary armies, and were apt to explode into major wars at any moment. The logistical situation had greatly changed since the time of the Hellenistic wars, when northern Italy was the only serious preoccupation elsewhere.<sup>75a</sup> Mithridates could reckon that Rome had little to spare for a war in Asia.<sup>76</sup> Rightly: in the twenty-five years of warfare with Mithridates down to 66, Rome was unable to spare more than five legions at any one time for the oriental war.<sup>77</sup> This was about the standard consular army of the second century, when two Roman legions were regularly matched by a similar force of Italian cohorts, for a consular command.<sup>78</sup> Mithridates could calculate that, even without the diversion of the Social War, the military problem was manageable.

Then there is the naval factor. Mithridates had an immense naval superiority which gave him control of the seas. The great Roman fleets that had opposed the Carthaginians and the Greek kings had been allowed to disintegrate. The Romans were reduced to dependency on the local flotillas of the Greek cities, which, except for the Rhodian contingent, were a scratch collection.<sup>79</sup> But Mithridates set about building a great fleet, which in 89 contained some 300 decked vessels, and was manned by trained men from Egypt and Phoenicia.<sup>80</sup> With this fleet he was able to sweep the seas clear of Roman men-of-war, so that Sulla's army was unable to cross the Aegean or even to attack the main base of the Pontic army in Euboea, and Roman reinforcements were harried in the passage of the Adriatic.<sup>81</sup> It was only the tactical and technical superiority of the veteran legions of Sulla, hardened in the bitter fighting of the Social War, that defeated the armies of Mithridates, which fought in Greece with remarkable courage and persistence. The fair-minded source

<sup>75</sup> cf. the speech attributed to Mithridates by Pompeius Trogus in Justin 38. 4-7, on the theme 'Romanos posse vinci', citing Aristonicus (6. 4), Jugurtha (6. 6), Cimbri (4. 15).

<sup>75a</sup> From 190 to 168, according to Afzelius' evaluation of the detailed evidence of Livy, from eight to ten legions, with their allied complement of five to eight thousand men apiece, were regularly deployed in the two Spains, north Italy, and in some years Sardinia, in consular and praetorian commands. The figure rises to twelve legions during the oriental wars, which required armies of four legions in some years, found in part by cutting down the garrison of north Italy, while two legions remained around Rome as a short-term strategic reserve. This figure, with the Italian complement, gives the maximum potential of Roman manpower under the traditional system. After the termination of Livy, statistical information disappears. A few isolated figures suggest that the standard consular and praetorian armies remained much the same in size down to 91. Pressure did not abate after 150, when the African war required five consuls out of six from 149 to 147, and renewed troubles in Spain took two consular armies each year, under consuls and proconsuls, from 143 to 134. Meanwhile Macedonia became a praetorian commitment from 146. Between 125 and 120, the conquest of Transalpine Gaul occupied four consuls, conjointly in some years. These overlapped with two consuls operating in Sardinia (126-2) and Nearer Spain (123-c. 121). Macedonia required consular attention from 114 to 107, overlapping with the Numidian war from 111 onwards, and with consular commands in north Italy in at least 113 and 109. The Numidian command in turn overlapped with consular activity in Gallia Transalpina from 107 to 105, when two armies were on foot in Gaul and a third in reserve in north Italy. Thus the sole intervention in Asia (131-29) fell in a rare quiescent period: the annual Roman requirement from 125 onwards could hardly be less than nine legions. See, for the period before 167, A. Afzelius, *Die römische Kriegsmacht* (1944), 47 f., 62 f., 78-9. For 146-101,

V. Ilari, *Gli Italici nelle strutture militari romane* (1974), 167 (with Strabo 4. 1. 1. added); P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower* (1971), 427 f. For the consular commands from 150 on, see T. R. S. Broughton, *Magistrates of the Roman Republic*<sup>2</sup> 1, under each year. For consular armies see n. 78 below. For praetorian commands, Livy 39. 30. 12; 40. 36. 8; 41. 5. 6-7, 21. 2, suggests a norm of one legion with *socii*, which frequently escalated by the retention of legions from year to year.

<sup>76</sup> cf. Justin 38. 4. 16: 'etiamsi singula bella sustinere Romani possint, universis tamen obruantur ut ne vacaturos quidem bello suo putet', a view that Trogus or his source evidently found tenable.

<sup>77</sup> Sulla has six legions in Campania in 88 (App., *B.C.* 1. 57), and takes five legions and some extra units to Greece and back (*Mithr.* 30; *B.C.* 1. 79). In Greece he acquires an extra legion mysteriously in 86, probably withdrawing it from Macedonia, Plut., *Sulla* 15. 4-5; Memnon, *FGrH* 434, (22), 12. Valerius Flaccus took out only two legions, which Sulla left behind for Murena (App., *Mithr.* 51, 64). L. Lucullus took out only one legion to add to four legions then stationed in Asia and Cilicia, Plut., *Luc.* 7. 1, 8. 4; App., *Mithr.* 72. Aurelius Cotta seems not to have a consular army in addition to his fleet. After infantry losses of three to five thousand men at Chalcedon, little was left to join Lucullus: App., *Mithr.* 71; Plut., *Luc.* 8. 2; Memnon *FGrH* 434, (27), 7-8.

<sup>78</sup> Pol. 6. 19-20, 21. 4, 6, 26. 3, 7 f. Cf. A. Afzelius, op. cit. (n. 75<sup>a</sup>), 34 f., 62 f.; V. Ilari, op. cit. (n. 75<sup>a</sup>), ch. vi; P. A. Brunt, op. cit. (n. 75<sup>a</sup>), 681 f.

<sup>79</sup> cf. my discussion op. cit. (n. 49), 4-5, nn. 9-14. Sulla, arriving in Greece in 87 without a fleet after the surrender of the Asiatic flotilla in 89, was confined to land operations in Achaëa until his quaestor Lucullus returned, in the winter of 86-5, with a naval force collected with difficulty from Syria, Rhodes and Pamphylia: App., *Mithr.* 17, 19, 33, 51; Plut., *Luc.* 2. 2-3, 3. 1-3, 4. 1.

<sup>80</sup> App., *Mithr.* 13.

<sup>81</sup> App., *Mithr.* 51.

of Appian went out of his way to commend them for their first successes: 'though few in number they mastered a much more numerous enemy, not through accidents of terrain or the mistakes of the other side, but by the merit of their generals and the courage of the soldiery'.<sup>82</sup> They were unlucky to come up against the legions of Sulla, trained by the professionalism of the Social War to a level that had seldom been reached before. Against lesser men, notably the legions of Murena in 83, and those of Triarius at Zela in 67, they won impressive victories.<sup>83</sup>

Militarily the prospects were good. But there was more to it than that. Mithridates might well take the view that the Romans drew a clear distinction between their interest in European Greece and their commitment in Anatolia. In Macedonia, since the occupation of 148, they had maintained a major military presence that escalated to meet foreign dangers, and the proconsuls had steadily extended their control over the neighbouring tribes.<sup>84</sup> But in Asia the presence and the policy of Rome had been static. There was still no serious military establishment. The resumption of the districts of Lycaonia and Phrygia—taken back impartially from the kings of Pontus and Cappadocia—was no more than a return to the original terms of the inheritance of Attalus. The recent interventions in Cilicia and Cappadocia were concerned with the maintenance of the *status quo*.<sup>85</sup> Mithridates might well conclude from the management of Roman policy in Anatolia during the last half century, and from his own experience of it during the last fifteen years, that the Romans were by no means committed to the expansion of their empire east of the Aegean or even to the maintenance of their position in Asia at all costs. He was, as we have seen, a great intriguer and a great negotiator, sharp to press his advantage, but quick to withdraw from a dangerous position before reaching the point of no return, always the man to prefer half a loaf to no bread. That he seized the golden opportunity of 89 to destroy the provincial levies of Cassius and Oppius, and that he invaded Macedonia and Greece in the summer of 88 when the Romans failed to despatch a consular army against him, does not mean that he expected to retain all the territories that he had so swiftly occupied.<sup>86</sup> But the greater his success in Europe, the stronger would be his bargaining position for a final settlement.

Unfortunately he misjudged not only the effectiveness of the Roman war machine at the moment but the spirit of contemporary Roman imperialism. The springs of foreign policy were altering in these years. It is not just that the Senate had belatedly recognized the dangerous growth of the empire of Mithridates, and was now determined to check it, or that a Roman consular, according to a somewhat apocryphal anecdote, had privately warned Mithridates either to make himself the equal of Rome or silently obey her commands.<sup>87</sup> All that was standard Roman policy and propaganda in Asiatic affairs. Eumenes of Pergamum,

<sup>82</sup> App., *Mithr.* 19. At Chaeronea the sources criticize the tactics of Archelaus, but not the valour of his men, who crack only in the final rout: App., *Mithr.* 42-4; Plut., *Sulla* 17. 9-19. 8. Their skill in siege warfare was outstanding, App., *Mithr.* 34-7, 40.

<sup>83</sup> App., *Mithr.* 65, 89; Plut., *Luc.* 35. 1-2. The loss of twenty four tribunes and one hundred and fifty centurions at Zela indicates a major disaster, even if exaggerated by the friends of Pompeius.

<sup>84</sup> After increasing trouble with the Scordisci from 118 onwards (*SIG*<sup>3</sup> 700), Macedonia became a consular province from 114 to c. 107: Livy, *Ep.* 63, 65; Florus I. 39. 4-5; *ILLRP* 1337; *Fasti Triumph.* for 106. After the campaign of the praetorian T. Didius c. 102-1, the territory of the Caeni was annexed, cf. *Lex Cnidia* IV, 5-30.

<sup>85</sup> Above, p. 69 f.

<sup>86</sup> The alert will notice a revision of the chronology of Reinach for the beginning of the war, hitherto unchallenged despite the difficulties that it creates (cf. Will, op. cit. II, 398-9). Reinach, op. cit. 112 f., attributed the campaigns of Mithridates in Anatolia, the siege of Rhodes and the invasion of Achaëa to 88, when the crisis of the Social War was passed, so that in 90-89 Mithridates, taken by surprise, 'missed the bus.' Reinach based his dates on the serial order of events in Livy, *Ep.* 76-9, despite its ambiguities and

his rejection of one of its statements. He ignored the order of events in the detailed narrative of Appian (*Mithr.* 17-21), which places the warfare in Anatolia and the occupation of Asia before the consular elections of 89 and the assignment of Asia as a consular province; while the siege of Rhodes, mopping-up in Lycia and Paphlagonia, the despatch of Archelaus to Achaëa and his clash with the proconsul of Macedonia, are set in the year of Sulla's consulship (88), when political events at Rome prevented the normal departure of the consul with his army for the campaigning season. Appian's order of events makes much better sense of this protracted series of campaigns, but the matter needs discussion elsewhere. Livy's *Epitomes* and the other subsidiary sources are susceptible of various interpretations; so too the amended Olympic date in *Mithr.* 17. Orosius (5. 19. 2.), using Livian compendia, was justly puzzled about the year 88: 'utrum abhinc primum coeperit an tunc praecipue exarsit (bellum).'

<sup>87</sup> Plut., *Marius* 31. Marius in 90-8, during his unofficial visit to Cappadocia and Galatia *religionis causa*, addresses Mithridates thus. Too much has been made of this 'secret history' by R. J. Luce, *Historia* 19 (1970), 162 f., following E. Badian, op. cit. (n. 69), 279 f.

Antiochus Epiphanes, the Rhodians, Demetrius, and Prusias of Bithynia, had all received a dose of that medicine in their time.

What is new is the attitude of the Roman proconsuls in Asia in 89 to the notion of aggrandisement. Appian gives a startling account of the final breach between Mithridates and the Roman leaders. First, they force Nicomedes, after his restoration, to provoke Mithridates by plundering his territory, and then, after rejecting his protests, they organize the three-fold invasion of Pontus, in an act of open war for which Appian three times firmly asserts that they had no authority at all from the Senate or People of Rome.<sup>88</sup> It is difficult to discount this tradition. The first part of it, the enforcement of Nicomedes, can be traced back from Appian, and other late sources, to the Roman annalists of the late Republic, through a brief allusion in the *Histories* of Sallust (which did not cover this period), when Sallust attributed to Mithridates the charge: 'me . . . per Nicomedem bello lacessiverunt'.<sup>89</sup> It was not the policy of the Roman Senate, amid the turmoil of the Social War in Italy, wantonly to stir up a major war in Anatolia. They expected, rightly, that a minor show of force would secure their purpose. Hence the despatch of two praetors to Asia, with modest forces and the advice of a consular commission, to support the restoration of the two kings in the style of the previous operation of Sulla.<sup>90</sup> But what emerges in Appian is the first manifestation of the aggressive imperialism of the individual army commanders of the late Republic, notably documented by Lucullus' invasion of Armenia, the Caucasian campaigns of Pompeius, the campaigns of Caesar in Transalpine Gaul and Crassus' invasion of Parthia. This was not the official policy of the Roman Senate, whose objective, fulfilled by Sulla in the Peace of Dardanus, was merely to confine Mithridates to his native kingdom.<sup>91</sup> The emergence of this new attitude in the context of Anatolia was fatal to the ultimate expectations of Mithridates. Once the ambitions of military men had turned towards the East, the possibility of negotiated settlements must disappear, and the old Roman implacability, shown of old to the Samnites and to Carthage, would assert itself in a new environment, as in the end it did, through Lucullus and Pompeius. But I would insist that the final development should not be assumed as the operative factor in the mind of Mithridates or of the Roman Senate before its first manifestation in 89.

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<sup>88</sup> App., *Mithr.* 15, 17, 19.

<sup>89</sup> Sallust, *Hist.* IV fr. 69. 10. Cf. Florus 1. 40. 3; Dio fr. 97; Justin 38. 5. 10.

<sup>90</sup> Oppius, whose *provincia* covered southern Phrygia and Lycaonia, was probably intended, like Sulla, to restore Ariobarzanes to Cappadocia (though he is not named in App., *Mithr.* 11), while Cassius in Lydia and northern Phrygia was well placed to assist Nicomedes in Bithynia. Cf. App., *Mithr.* 17, 20. This may be the first occasion of the division of the provinces, cf. my discussion op. cit. (n. 49), 9.

<sup>91</sup> cf. Justin's technical language (38. 3. 4): 'decernitur in senatu ut uterque in regnum restituantur, in quam rem missi M'. Aquilius etc.', confirming App., *Mithr.* 11. The use of force was

authorized against Socrates (Justin 38. 5. 8): 'regem Bithyniae Chreston in quem senatus arma decreverat'. There is not one word about war with Mithridates. When Pelopidas, in the prolonged negotiations with Aquilius and Cassius, eventually proposes that the Senate should be consulted, the Romans promptly dismiss him and organize their offensive without referring the request to Rome, App., *Mithr.* 16-17. Earlier they pressed Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes to attack Mithridates' territory precisely because they lacked direct authority for this themselves, App., *Mithr.* 11: 'and so to provoke Mithridates to war, because the Romans would support the kings as allies if they were at war.'